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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents would add to Appellant's statement that although 
fraud was alleged against Marvin Pursinger and Pursinger Company, 
Inc., no fraud was alleged against MFT Leasing. The ground for 
Respondents action for rescission was primarily based upon failure 
of consideration. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant's statement that the Court found "there was no 
fraud as alleged in plaintiff's complaint committed by defendant 
~n Leasing Company" is incorrect. No fraud was alleged against 
MFT Leasing Company but only against the other defendants. 
Appellant's contention that the Judgment and Findings 
were entered by the Court before Appellant had a chance to 
object are not well taken. The Court entered an Order revising 
the Findings following some of the points raised in the Appellant's 
Objection to Findings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant will hereafter be referred to as MFT Leasing and 
Respondents will be referred to by their surnames Nielsen and 
Walton or as Respondents. 
Respondents will state the salient facts in numbered para-
graphs rather than in narrative form in the interest of clarity 
an~ conciseness: 
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1. Some time in late December 1978 MFT Leasing received , 
package from Dividend Leasing requesting that they handle the 
leases enclosed therein, among which were two proposed leases fo: 
Mr. Nielsen and one for Mr. Walton. 
2. On January 11, 1979, Mr. Barr of MFT Leasing made a 
trip to California where he discussed the leasing program 
with Mr. Pursinger and his attorney. At that time, he had in 
his possession a credit report and/or a Dun & Bradstreet report 
which showed numerous cases under litigation and claims against 
Pursinger by other computer companies. ( R. 107-111) 
3. Thereafter, MFT Leasing prepared leases on their own 
forms and Mr. Barr traveled to Logan and met briefly with Mr. 
Nielsen and with Mr. Wal ton and obtained their signatures on the 
leases. This was the only personal contact. of MFT Leasing with 
Respondents. At that time, he was told: 
a. That the equipment was there in boxes. (R. 23) 
b. That Pursinger himself would be subleasing the 
equipment. (R. 78,88) (R. 27) 
4. The lease documents, prepared by MFT, specifically stat' 
that to be included is: "Systems installation, site inspection. · 
installation • • • function and operation testing ..• hard wiring 
necessary " and software and other equipment identified by 
thirty or more serial or model numbers for each lease. None of ' 
-2-
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these items were ever completed or supplied and these facts were 
J<nown by Mr. Barr. 
the equipment· 
(R. 115) He made no attempt to look at 
5. While the computer units were at the Plaintiff's premises, 
Mr. Teuscher copied all of the numbers on the equipment and 
stated that there were no other numbers on the equipment. The 
numbers copied by him show no resemblance to any of the numbers 
on the leases. There was only one number for each piece of equip-
ment and only two pieces of equipment for each lease. 
6. On the 24th of January, 1979, without further contacting 
the Plaintiffs, Mr. Barr paid to Pursinger Company through their 
agent $70,561 for the Nielsen equipment and $35,280 for the 
Wal ton equipment. 
7. From the above payments the following amounts were re-
tained by MFT: 
a. $2,032 as the first month payment on the Nielsen 
leases. (R. 230) 
b. $1,016 as the first month payment on the 
Walton lease. 
c. $7,084 as a security deposit on the Nielsen 
leases, representing 10% of the equipment cost which was to 
apply on the oral option to purchase at the end of the lease. 
(R. 230) 
-3-
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d. $3,528 as a security deposit from Pursinger 
on the Walton lease, representing 10% of the equipment cost 
which was to apply on the oral option to purchase at the end 
of the lease. (R. 214-15) 
e. In addition to the foregoing, MFT received $25,000 
from Pursinger which was first in the form of a thrift certifica: 
which was later surrendered by Pursinger as a security 
deposit against the Walton & Nielsen leases. (R. 268) 
8. Respondents were given oral options to purchase the 
equipment at the end of the lease for 10% of original cost. 
The 10% option price was prepaid by Pursinger. (R. 119, 124-5, 
9. In early February, before any payment was due from the 
Respondents, MFT learned that Pursinger was under criminal con-
viction and was due to go to jail. (R. 128) (R. 215-6) 
10. Al though MFT Leasing contended at the trial that the 
first payment on the leases was due on March 10th, the leases 
clearly show and the testimony establishes that the first 
month payments had already been made by Pursinger. 
11. MFT made no qemand whatsoever for payment from the 
Respondents until after the rescission letter of April 11, 1979. 
(R. 220) 
12. On April 1, 1979, Plaintiff Nielsen received a call fro:, 
Datapoint Corporation advising that they owned al 1 of the equip-
-4-
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ment consisting of eleven computer units in 22 boxes in Nielsen's 
building. Datapoint demanded delivery of the equipment but 
Niel sen refused to deliver it. (R. 285) 
13. On April 11, 1979, a rescission letter was sent to 
Defendant MFT Leasing on the ground of failure of consideration. 
14. On April 11, 1979, Mr. Barr of MFT Leasing made a trip 
to Portland, Oregon where he conferred with Pursinger. He 
admitted that he knew that Pursinger had not delivered all of the 
equipment and that lessee performance was impossible. (R. 255-56) 
15. On April 16, 1979, Defendant MFT caused their attorneys 
to write a demand letter which was subsequently mailed to 
Respondents. Said demand letter gave Respondents ten days to make 
payment. (R. 261) 
16. On April 18, 1979, Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Walton were 
served with a temporary restraining order by Datapoint Corporation 
accompanied by an undertaking for $110,000.00 and a replevy action 
for the equipment. Datapoint alleged it was the owner of the 
equipment. Thereafter, pursuant to court process the Sheriff 
of Cache County picked up the equipment for Datapoint and removed 
it from Respondents premises. 
17. On April 18, 1979, MFT Leasing was served by Respondents 
with a summons and thereafter a Complaint for Rescission. 
-5-
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18. Thereafter, MFT Leasing intervened in the Datapoint 
case and by way of a settlement in November of 1979, received 
delivery of six boxes containing certain equipment the numbers 
on which were dissimilar to any numbers on the lease agreements 
At no time were Respondents ever advised where the said equip-
ment was kept by MFT Leasing nor was any effort made by MFT 
Leasing to sell or lease or redeliver said equipment to the 
Respondents. (R. 131) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECIDED THAT A LESSEE IS 
ENTITLED TO RESCIND IN A CASE WHERE THE FACTS ARE VERY NEARLY 
SIMILAR IN ALL RESPECTS. 
In its brief, Appellant makes no reference whatsoever to 
the case of FMA Financial vs. Hansen Dairy Inc. 617 P.2d 327, 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court August 21, 1980. 
In the Hansen case the court held that there was sufficient 
contact between lessor and the seller such that the lessor knew 
or should have known that the leased equipment had not all been 
delivered and installed despite the recitals in the lease. 
The facts in the instant case are even stronger. In the 
Hansen case, the lessee made substantial payments on the lease 
even though the major part of the equipment was never delivered. 
They also signed a lease which had substantially the same langur 
-6-
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s, 
in it i.e., that the equipment had been received and was in good 
order and acceptable as delivered or installed. The lessor 
argued that such language estopped the lessee from claiming a 
failure of consideration. The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the 
trial court's finding that FMA knew or should have known when 
they released the $36,000 that the building as a workable silo 
at Hansen's premises was not in existence. The Supreme Court 
then upheld the conclusion of the trial court that the Defendant 
lessee was not estopped from setting forth facts indicating 
the silo was not completed even though they had signed the 
acceptance notice in the lease. 
As to failure of consideration, the instant case is very 
much stronger. The equipment was not all delivered or installed 
as in the Hansen case. In addition, before MFT Leasing had sent 
any formal demand for payment a third party intervened and ulti-
mately replevied what equipment there was. Thus, rather than a 
partial failure of consideration there was complete failure of 
consideration. 
Further, Mr. Barr had at least as much information about 
the equipment as FMA did in the Hansen case. He was told it was 
still in boxes; he had advance information that judgments and 
lawsuits were pending against Pursinger exceeding $100,000 and that 
r said claims involved in nearly every instance computer or leasing 
-7-
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companies. He also learned in early February that Mr. Pursinge 
had been convicted of a crime and that the equipment was so 
incomplete that it was impossible for lessees to perform. He 
also knew of the claims of Datapoint Corporation and did 
nothing to keep the equipment that was there in the 
possession of the Respondents. 
Although it does not appear in the court's opinion, it is 
assumed that estoppel was pleaded in the Hansen case. It is 
not pleaded as an affirmative defense in the instant case in 
any event, and since the rules clearly state that estoppel is 
an affirmative defense, MFT Leasing has waived any defense 
of estoppel. U.C.R.P. Rule 8 (c) 
II. 11.PPELLANT MADE NO VALID OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF 
ANY PAROLE EVIDENCE. IN ANY EVENT THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE DOEo 
NOT APPLY TO EVIDENCE ON FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. 
Appellant's primary point apparently is that the Trial Cour 
erred in allowing Respondents to present parole evidence. No 
references whatsoever to any objections made by the MFT Leasing 
counsel appears in their brief. On page 9 of the brief the stat' 
ment is made "Over the objection of counsel for the defendant, 
MFT Leasing Company, that the testimony and exhibits were 
-8-
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parole evidence and not properly introduced, the court 
allowed plaintiffs to testify and to introduce numerous 
exhibits ..... " No reference to the record is given. 
Examination of the record shows very clearly that not only 
were no pertinent objections made to the introduction of any 
oarole evidence but that most of the parole evidence was brought 
out by MFT Leasing counsel themselves on cross examination or 
in examining their own witnesses. 
As a general rule, an appellate court will not entertain 
a claim of error in improperly admitting evidence unless the 
question was properly raised and reserved in the trial court. 
5 Am Jur 2d. 66 State vs. Gillies 40 Utah 541, 123 Pacific 93. 
It is well settled that with the exception of evidence pre-
cluded by statute and furtherance of public policy the failure 
to object to the introduction of evidence is a waiver of the right 
to do so and its admission even if incompetent is not a proper 
basis for appeal. State vs. Lowery 213 SE 2d. 255. 
In this case, it is not at all apparent that the 
parole evidence rule applies. No objections were made to the 
admission of evidence adding to or varying the terms of the 
""ritten lease agreement. No attempt was made to substitute a 
new and different contract for the one evidenced by the 
writing· The entire thrust of Respondent's contentions was that 
-9-
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there had been a complete or partial failure of consideration. 
The equipment listed in the lease agreements was incomplete, 
the equipment shown by serial number in the lease agree-
ments was not the same as the equipment delivered. What equip,, 
there was disappeared through a replevy action. 
The real objection to the use of parole evidence is not tho 
it is oral, as distinguished from written, but that it is extri: 
and tends to prove what is not a term of the contract. 30 Arn J,,. 
2d. 153 
The parole evidence rule presupposes an action based on an 
existing valid contract and if the issue is as to the validity 
or legality of the contract the rule, by its very terms, has 
no application, and extrinsic evidence is admitted to determine 
that issue. 30 Am Jur 2d. 171 
Parole or extrinsic evidence is also generally admissible 
at least as between the parties themselves to show that there wa: 
an absence or want of consideration or to show a failure of con· 
sideration. 30 Am Jur 2d. 193 
Generally speaking, no rule of evidence is violated by ad-
mitting parole evidence of the consideration for a promissory 
obligation if the purpose is to show that the consideration 
failed .••• and so far as failure of consideration arising after 
the execution of the contract is concerned, it must obviously, 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
be shown by parole evidence if it is to be shown at all. 
30 Am Jur 2d. 196 
III. NO APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES WERE MISAPPLIED IN 
ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO RESCIND. 
MFT Leasing contends that Respondents should not have been 
permitted to rescind because they were guilty of the first 
breach of the contract. The evidence is to the contrary. The 
court found and the record supports the fact that Pursinger him-
self paid the first month's lease payments for both Nielsen and 
Walton. Therefore, no payment was due for either until April 10, 
1979. (R. 230) No written demand whatsoever for payment was 
made by the MFT Leasing until April 16, 1979, which was five days 
after Mr. Nielsen had written his rescission letter. ( R. 261) 
MFT Leasing's contention that the Respondents did not have 
"clean hands" is not well taken. Nowhere does it appear that 
there was any fraud or misrepresentation or any other misconduct 
of any nature whatsoever on the part of Nielsen or Walton. To 
the contrary it was well established that before any payments were 
due under the leases, agents of MFT Leasing learned that Mr. 
Pursinger was under criminal conviction and was due to go to 
iail. (R. 128, 215-216) Further, prior to MFT Leasing 
making any payment to Pursinger and his company for the 
equipment, MFT Leasing had credit reports and a Dun & Bradstreet 
-11-
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report which showed claims and judgments in excess of $100,ooo 
against Pursinger by other leasing companies and computer 
companies. ( R. 107-111) This information was not communicate, 
Respondents until after MFT Leasing had made payment to Pursino 
There is no merit in MFT Leasing's contention that Nielse· 
and Walton created the circumstances themselves. Appellant's 
agent came to Logan and induced Nielsen and Wal ton to execute 
the leases. No prior contact was made with MFT Leasing by eith 
Nielsen or Wal ton. Al 1 of the arrangements were made directly 
between MFT Leasing and Mr. Pursinger and his company. 
IV. WHETHER OR NOT MFT LEASING HAD TECHNICAL TITLE IS 
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE EQUIPMENT WAS REPLEVIED FROM RESPONDENT'S 
POSSESSION. MFT LEASING DID NOT ACT IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONA[ 
MANNER AFTER RESPONDENTS WERE DEPRIVED OF POSSESSION. 
MFT Leasing makes the point of trying to utilize Article~ 
of the Uniform Commercial Code in establishing that as between 
MFT Leasing and Datapoint the Seller, MFT Leasing had ownership 
and title to the leased property. Whether or not that is corre: 
cannot affect the rights of Respondents. The facts are that 
the equipment was picked up by Datapoint, the Seller, under 
claim of ownership and that MFT Leasing did nothing to get pos· 
session of the equipment until November of 1979. Since that 
time, MFT Leasing did nothing toward leasing or selling or other,' 
-12-
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acting in a commercially reasonable manner to dispose of the equip-
ment. 
In Respondent's point of view it is really immaterial as 
to whether Datapoint's claim was valid. Respondents were deprived 
of possession by Datapoint under a claim of ownership. If 
MFT Leasing's argument is valid, then they should have been able 
to regain immediate possession by Motion for Summary Judgment or 
some other remedy provided by the rules such as putting up a 
bond and regaining immediate possession and returning it to 
Respondents. 
In effect, what MFT Leasing is trying to do is get a deficiency. 
Thi.s follows since the equipment was replevied and has never 
been returned nor has any offer to return been made to the 
Resopndents. This is even assuming that the equipment is that 
which is 1 isted in the lease. 
In FMA Financial Corporation vs. Pro Printers 590 P. 2d. 803 
the issue is whether or not Plaintiff can get a deficiency against 
the Defendant lessee. The court held that FMA did not act in a 
commercially reasonable manner when it did not give the proper 
notice and did not sell the property for about eleven months after 
it re-took possession. The court concluded FMA could get no 
deficiency. 
-13-
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The facts in the instant case are even stronger. MFT Leas. 
has not disposed of the collateral in any way permitted under": 
§70a-9-504(3). No sale was made. Had sixty percent or more of 
the payments been made, sale would have been mandatory within 
ninety days. Since sixty percent or more of the payments had 
not been made, it follows that MFT Leasing had additional time 
in which to make a sale or in the alternative, keep the collater1 
full satisfaction. However, nothing was done after Respondents 
were deprived of possession. It should follow as a matter of 
law that MFT Leasing did not act in a commercially reasonable 
manner. This is particularly true since the equipment in questi 
depreciates rapidly and would have only a nominal value at the 
end of a five year lease. 
Under Uniform Commercial Code § 70a 9-504( 3), every aspect 
of the disposition of collateral following default must be 
commercially reasonable. §70a 9-504(2) requires the exercise 
of commercial reasonableness in proceeding to collect from an 
account debtor. Such provisions imply that the secured party 
must exercise commercially reasonable judgment in determining 
whether to resell the collateral or merely to retain it. 69 Arn J 
2d. § 606 footnote 50. 
If the property is to be sold, the sale can apparently 
be made at any time or place but the place and time must be 
-14-
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subject to the requirement of commercial reasonableness. 
69 Arn Jur 2d. §606. 
The instant case is also stronger than Pro Printers, in that 
MFT Leasing is here attempting to get the benefit of its bargain 
and not just recover a deficiency as is permitted under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The court made very extensive Findings of Fact which 
are all supported by the record. From this the court properly 
concluded that the Respondents had a right to rescind. There 
was complete failure of consideration not only in the fact that 
the equipment as delivered was incomplete but in the further 
fact that the serial numbers in no way matched the numbers of 
the equipment on the leases. Moreover, the overwhelming failure 
of consideration occurred when the property was replevied by 
Datapoint claiming to be the owner. MFT Leasing did nothing 
to remedy that situation so far as lessee Respondents were con-
cerned. 
Respondents therefore respectfully submit that the Judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /3 day of April, 1981. 
BARRETT & MATHEWS 
~~c'L~\-4~~ 
w. Scott Barrett 
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